Join us in Auerbach 321 or online this Wednesday, Feb. 5, from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m., for our next meeting of the Philosophy Club as professor Brian Skelly presents, "Is Anything Priceless?"
A question that looms large in metaethics and which is of the greatest significance to normative ethics is whether anything is genuinely priceless; or in other words: are there inestimable values. It looms large in metaethics because, as the branch of ethics that concerns understanding and explaining what the input values to moral judgment are—i.e. the basic goods and evils over we deliberate to make judgments of what is right, wrong, etc., it is hard to see how we could settle such a matter so apparently early on in our inquiry. We typically think of goods and evils as weighing for or against one another in a sort of coalition-forming calculus, in which the greatest coalition at the conclusion of our deliberation in some manner determines the decision made. Things they weigh for or against a matter typically—or at least it would seem—would be things that can be weighed. But if there is a priceless value, that is to say, a value of inestimable worth, then it simply cannot be weighed at all, leaving serious questions about how such a value could be handled in moral deliberation at all. But this should not make us blush, since philosophical inquiries, unlike axiomatic ones, have no absolute beginning point, but can and should be elaborated upon at any point seen fit.
The question is, moreover, of the greatest significance to normative ethics because an affirmative answer that yes, there are inestimable values refutes the possibility that utilitarianism can be true.
Normative ethics is the branch of ethics that asks the question: what makes right acts right, and other derivative question. Utilitarianism bases the judgment of right action upon the criterion of the maximization of net positive consequences, choosing as right whatever possible alternative to be considered possesses that quality. But the carrying out of such a deliberative process requires all values relevant to a decision-making situation to be weighed against one another by receiving an estimate value in terms of how good or how bad. Utilitarianism, perhaps because of its usual association with the metaethical theory of hedonism, which claims that all values ultimately reduce to pleasures as goods or pains as evils, usually carries with it a background assumption that all values to be considered in normative ethical deliberation will be finite. But although it is possible for utilitarianism to be true even without its hedonist association, it cannot be true if there are values that cannot be given a value for entry into its cost-benefit analysis. Being aware of this, utilitarians recognize that part of their defense is to deny the existence of inestimable values. (Complete document)
The University of Hartford Philosophy Club has an informal, jovial atmosphere. It is a place where students, professors, and people from the community at large meet as peers. Sometimes presentations are given, followed by discussion. Other times, topics are hashed out by the whole group.
Presenters may be students, professors, or people from the community. Anyone can offer to present a topic. The mode of presentation may be as formal or informal as the presenter chooses.
Come and go as you wish. Bring friends. Suggest topics and activities. Take over the club! It belongs to you! Just show up! - Brian Skelly bskelly@hartford.edu or 413.273.2273