Join us in Auerbach Hall 321 or online this Wednesday, Feb. 19, from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m., for our next meeting of the University of Hartford Philosophy Club as we read and discuss "Democracy as a Universal Moral Obligation."
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Democracy has long been taken for granted by many of us as a cornerstone of our existence, not to be moved or marred, but only to be built upon. Now when social currents threatening democracy seem to be gaining ground, it is incumbent upon us to be clearer on what we are talking about when we are talking about democracy.
In our varied discussions about democracy, three related but distinct topic areas appear. First is democracy as a certain kind of structure of government, variable and tweakable within certain parameters; secondly, democracy as the contradictory opposite of authoritarianism; and third, democracy as an ideal by which we judge to what extent the attempts we notice at democratic leadership in the organizations to which belong are successful or not.
Democracy in the first sense is a toolbox of political possibilities related to the forms of compromise, mostly institutionalized (i.e., planned, not spontaneous) that might be suitably used to advance or fulfill democratic intentions in diverse situations and groups. These include the various forms of democracy, such as parliamentary or presidential; representative or direct; democracy between sub-groups (e.g. U.S. states), or between individuals; by vote, either among elected or appointed officials, or among individual members; with some matters being settled by plurality vote, some by majority, some by 60 percent, some by two-thirds, some three fourths, and some by unanimity. Other possibilities might be division of decision-making duties, taking turns, or argument to consensus. While it is difficult to imagine a case that any of these and many more possible means of compromise should be considered the unique and definitive way to be democratic, there are certainly some obviously noteworthy commonalities among them, especially as the size of the group governed increases. This manner of discussion presents a variety of forms, a sort of spectrum of democratic forms, in which there may in various senses be more-or-less choices for us to make.
A second way of speaking about democracy is less about form, but more about moral purpose. If the choice for authoritarian leadership is presented to us, then the question of democracy becomes, properly speaking, an either-or choice, since authoritarianism is by definition non-democratic. In such a case, we are committing a version of the false choice fallacy if we try to disguise the democratic choice as the extreme along a spectrum, with other choices wedged in between it and authoritarianism. This is not to say there cannot be more than one democratic choice, but we are fooled if we think there is some middle ground when there is none.
This way of conceiving democracy as the contradictory opposite of authoritarianism we will see eventually converges at least in part with the third sense discussed below.
The University of Hartford Philosophy Club has an informal, jovial atmosphere. It is a place where students, professors, and people from the community at large meet as peers. Sometimes presentations are given, followed by discussion. Other times, topics are hashed out by the whole group.
Presenters may be students, professors, or people from the community. Anyone can offer to present a topic. The mode of presentation may be as formal or informal as the presenter chooses.
Come and go as you wish. Bring friends. Suggest topics and activities. Take over the club! It belongs to you! Just show up! - Brian Skelly bskelly@hartford.edu or 413.273.2273.